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For nearly a century, the Carmack Amendment ("Carmack") to the
Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") has governed the liability of inter-
state motor carriers. Carmack limits a carrier's liability to the actual
loss or injury to the property transported. Congress enacted Carmack
in 1906 to end the inconsistent results of applying 50 different state
law regimes to interstate transportation agreements and to stabilize
carrier transportation rates.
Since Carmack's passage, the federal courts have almost universally
construed it to preempt state tort actions, including punitive damages,
against interstate carriers arising from loss or damage to goods in
transit and the processing of related claims. Historically, state law
claims have been held preempted because their liability standards are
incompatible with Carmack's 'actual loss' standard. Relying on dicta
in the First Circuit's decision in Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc.,2 how-
ever, a few courts have encouraged shippers to assert intentional tort
claims that circumvent Carmack and bill of lading limitations of car-
rier liability.
To the extent Rini's dicta and its progeny sanction intentional tort
claims designed to increase carrier liability based solely on contractual
conduct, these cases are wrongly decided and in conflict with Carmack
and United States Supreme Court rulings that define Carmack's pre-
emptive scope. By focusing on claims for personal injuries that are
supposedly distinct from loss or damage to the shipper's goods, Rini's
dicta and the cases relying on it err by disregarding whether such inju-
ries actually flow from the carrier's non-performance of the bill of lad-
ing contract instead of a breach of a general duty of care to the public.
Recently, a bill was re-introduced in the 107th Congress that would
exclude from Carmack preemption certain punitive damage suits
1. Mr. Wright is the principal of George W. Wright & Associates, LLC in New York City and
Hackensack, New Jersey. The author acknowledges the assistance of Victoria R. Pekerman,
Esq. with this article.
2. 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir. 1997).
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against interstate motor carriers for alleged unfair claim handling
under state deceptive trade practices acts. 3 Although the proposed
bill is christened the "Moving Company Responsibility Act"
("MCRA"), it indiscriminately authorizes punitive damages against
all motor carriers, household goods and general freight carriers alike,
"for engaging in unfair or deceptive trade practices in the processing
of claims relating to loss, damage, injury or delay in connection with
transportation of property in interstate commerce." '4
The extension of Rini's dicta and the introduction of the MCRA in
Congress are only the latest efforts to usurp Carmack's exclusive do-
minion over interstate carrier bill of lading liability. Some years ago,
the Massachusetts federal court rendered two decisions restricting the
scope of Carmack preemption by dividing interstate shipping transac-
tions into pre-move, move and post-move phases.5 The Massachusetts
approach was generally rejected by the other federal courts and even-
tually overruled by the First Circuit in Rini.6 While closing one door,
Rini left another slightly ajar by hinting at intentional tort theories as
a way for shippers to skirt around Carmack.
Parts 1I through V review the ICA's uniform federal liability
scheme and the statutory and judicial evolution of the doctrine of Car-
mack preemption of state and common law. Parts VI and VII ex-
amine current procedures and remedies for resolving shipper-carrier
disputes and how the proposed MCRA would actually subvert, not
complement, the ICA. The author opines that there are no public pol-
icy considerations or empirical evidence justifying suspension of Car-
mack preemption with respect to any kind of interstate motor carrier
transportation services, including claim handling. In Part VIII the au-
thor further concludes that the proposed MCRA would undermine
the ICA's time-tested policies and uniform federal remedies.
II. THE CARMACK PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The doctrine of preemption essentially means that when federal law
regulates a particular activity, the states may not also regulate it with
their own laws. The United States Supreme Court has held that the
test of federal preemption ". . . is whether the matter on which the
3. S. 1316, 107th Cong. (2001) (re-introduced by Sen. John F. Kerry (D-MA)). The bill was
previously introduced as S. 2396, 106th Cong. (2000) and H.R. 5060, 106th Cong. (2000).
4. 147 CoNo. REc. S8704 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
5. See Mesta v. Allied Van Lines Int'l, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 63 (D. Mass. 1988); Sokhos v.
Mayflower Transit, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1578 (D. Mass. 1988).
6. 104 F.3d at 506 n.3.
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State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal
Act. If it is, the federal scheme prevails. . .7
A. Constitutional Origin of Preemption
The principle of federal preemption of inconsistent state laws is
founded on the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 8, of the
Constitution recites, "The Congress shall have the Power ... To regu-
late Commerce ... among the several States ... [t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers . "8 Article VII, the Supremacy Clause, provides,
"... the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." 9
In the debates preceding ratification of the Constitution, future
President James Madison argued in The Federalist Papers, in response
to attacks on the Supremacy Clause, that "as the constitutions of the
States differ much from each other, it might happen that a... national
law.. .would interfere with some and not with other constitutions, and
would consequently be valid in some of the States, at the same time
that it would have no effect on others."10 Madison opined that a fed-
eral republic without federal law supremacy would become "a mon-
ster, in which the head was under the direction of the members."11
B. History of the ICA and Carmack Amendment
With the rapid development of interstate transportation in the late
19th century, the impossibility of reconciling inconsistent state laws in
disputes between shippers and interstate carriers cried out for a uni-
form federal solution. Even before the ICA was enacted, the United
States Supreme Court recognized the need for national laws gov-
erning interstate transportation. In 1883 the Supreme Court held:
What constitutes a contract of carriage is not a question of local law,
upon which the decision of a State court must control. It is a matter
of general law, upon which this Court will exercise its own
judgment.
If we are to follow on this subject the ruling of the State courts, we
should be obliged to give a different interpretation to the same act -
the reception of goods marked for a place beyond the road of the
7. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 18.
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 296 (James Madison) (Palladium Press ed., 2000).
11. Id.
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company - in different States, holding it to imply one thing in Illi-
nois and another in Massachusetts.12
In 1885 the United States Supreme Court commented again on the
need for uniform federal laws governing the rights, duties and liabili-
ties of carriers providing interstate transportation services:
Necessarily that [Congressional] power alone can prescribe regula-
tions which are to govern the whole country ... Congress alone,
therefore, can deal with such [interstate] transportation; its non-ac-
tion is a declaration that it shall remain free from burdens imposed
by State legislation.1 3
In 1887 Congress passed the ICA to regulate the interstate trans-
portation of goods. In its original form, the ICA governed interstate
carriers' freight rates, but not their liability for loss and damage to
goods. In 1903 the United States Supreme Court reviewed a case in-
volving an equine shipment from New York to Pennsylvania. Depart-
ing from its earlier 1884 ruling in Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,14
which also involved a horse shipment, the Supreme Court held that a
claim for damage to an interstate shipment did not present a federal
question and, thus, the states could determine the liability of interstate
carriers under their own laws. 15 The inconsistent decisions on inter-
state carrier liability in pre-Carmack cases, even in the United States
Supreme Court's own rulings, underscored the pressing need for a
uniform federal liability scheme for the nation's interstate transporta-
tion system.
In 1906 Congress passed the Hepburn Act amending the ICA. The
Hepburn Act's provisions governing interstate carrier liability, com-
monly known as the Carmack Amendment, were originally set out in
Title 49 U.S.C. § 20(11). The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 extended
Carmack to interstate motor carriers.' 6 In 1978 the ICA was recodi-
fied, with Carmack then found at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10730 and 11707. The
ICA was recodified again effective January 1, 1996, in the ICC Termi-
nation Act of 1995 ("ICCTA"), 17 where Carmack is now found at 49
U.S.C. § 14706. Section 14706(a) provides, in part, "The liability im-
posed under this paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the
property .... 18
12. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Myrick, 107 U.S. 102, 109-10 (1883).
13. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 204 (1885).
14. 112 U.S. 331, 338 (1884) ("It is the law of this court that a common carrier may, by special
contract, limit his common-law liability.").
15. Pa. R.R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 491 (1903).
16. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543.
17. Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 1:177
CARMACK PREEMPTION
The 1978 recodification of the ICA was without substantive change
to its original provisions at 49 U.S.C. § 20(11). 19 In the 1978 statute,
the word "injury" in former Section 11707(a)(1) was substituted for
the original phrase "damage, or injury" as being more inclusive. 20 The
phrase "injury to the property" in the former Section 11707(a)(1),
now continued in Section 14706(a)(1), encompasses more than mere
physical loss or damage to goods. It includes any injury to or invasion
of tangible or intangible property rights and economic loss not directly
related to physical damage.21
C. The Carmack Amendment's Uniformity Policy
By enacting the Carmack Amendment a century ago, Congress in-
tended to cut through the Gordian knot of state laws and regulations
that had long entangled interstate transportation contracts. Car-
mack's uniform "actual loss" liability standard enables both interstate
carriers and shippers to assess their transportation risks and allows
carriers to predict their potential liability for damages.2 2 Carmack's
statutory scheme reflects Congress' efforts to reach a deliberate bal-
ancing of shipper and carrier interests.
1. Carmack's Uniform Burden of Proof
Under Carmack, shippers are relieved of traditional tort liability
burdens, such as proving which of several involved carriers is responsi-
ble and whether a carrier's conduct actually or proximately caused the
loss. 23 Carmack replaces tort principles with a type of strict carrier
liability under which the carrier may assert only limited defenses.2 4
While carriers lost some of their common law defenses under Car-
mack, they gained the certainty that the rules governing proof of loss
19. H.R. REP. No. 95-1395 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3009.
20. Id. at 3205.
21. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Burts, 612 F. Supp. 441, 444 (D. Md. 1984); Reagan v. Commonwealth
Theaters of P.R., Inc., 300 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D.P.R. 1969).
22. A.T. Clayton & Co. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 901 F.2d 833, 835 (10th Cir. 1990);
Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1415 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913
(1988); Suarez v. United Van Lines, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 815, 816 (D. Colo. 1992).
23. Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113, 119 (1950) (Carmack Amendment relieves the shipper
of the burden of searching for the particular carrier at fault).
24. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1964) (the limited carrier
defenses are act of God, act of public enemy, act of public authority, act of shipper and inherent
vice of the goods).
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or damage and carrier liability would be uniformly applied throughout
the nation regardless of the route a shipment might take.25
The balance between shipper and carrier rights achieved by Car-
mack represents an equitable historic compromise that has worked
well for the last century. A shipper may, without having to prove car-
rier negligence, recover its "actual loss" for goods lost, damaged or
delayed in transit and no more. The carrier will be liable for the loss if
the shipper establishes a prima facie case26 to which none of the car-
rier's limited defenses applies. Not only do shippers and carriers ben-
efit from Carmack, the general public also benefits from lower, more
stable transportation rates and uniform, predictable carrier liability
standards.
2. Carmack's Omission of Punitive Damages Remedy
Carmack contains no proviso for punitive relief to shippers.27 In
giving effect to a statute, a court may not read into its terms that
which the legislature has excluded.2 8 The United States Supreme
Court's early decisions and the United States Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals that have recently addressed the issue have held that the ICA
and ICCTA do not authorize punitive damages and that such damages
are incompatible with the federal law's basic goals of stable interstate
transportation rates and a uniform national carrier liability policy.
A few years after Carmack was passed, the United States Supreme
Court observed that it does not authorize punitive relief against carri-
ers. In Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. International Coal Mining Co.29
the Court held with reference to the ICA:
There were many provisions in the statute for imprisonment and
fines. On the civil side the Act provided for compensation - not
punishment.
25. Hughes, 829 F.2d at 1415; see also Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co.,
721 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1983) (purpose of Carmack is to provide a "paramount and uniform
national law" of carrier liability).
26. D.P. Apparel Corp. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 736 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (the shipper's
burden is to prove delivery in good condition to the carrier, arrival at destination short, damaged
or delayed and the amount of damages).
27. 49 U.S.C. §14706 (2002).
28. In re Borba, 736 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1984); Marsano v. Laird, 298 F. Supp. 280, 283
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 412 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1969); Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Fried, 245
F. Supp. 211, 217 (D. Conn. 1965).
29. 230 U.S. 184 (1913).
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[I]nstead of giving the shipper the right to recover a penalty fixed in
amount or measure, the statute made the guilty carrier liable for the
full amount of damages sustained...30
3. Adams Express Establishes Complete Carmack Preemption
The same year the high Court decided Pennsylvania R.R., it consid-
ered whether a carrier's bill of lading liability for loss of a package
containing a diamond ring was governed by Carmack or by Kentucky
law which forbade contractual limitations of liability.31 After review-
ing the ICA's history in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,32 the Court
characterized the pre-Carmack provincialization of interstate carrier
liability as follows:
Some states allow carriers to exempt themselves from all or part of
the common-law liability ... others did not. The Federal courts sit-
ting in the various states were following the local rule, a carrier being
held liable in one court when, under the same state of facts, he would
be exempt from liability in another. Hence this branch of interstate
commerce was being subjected to such a diversity of legislative and
judicial holding that it was practically impossible for a shipper.., to
know, without considerable investigation and trouble, and even
then oftentimes with but little certainty, what would be the carrier's
actual responsibility as to goods delivered to it for transportation
from one state to another.33
The Adams Express court recognized that Carmack's purpose was
to abolish the multistate legal patchwork governing interstate carrier
liability under bills of lading through a complete supplanting of state
law:
The congressional action has made an end to this diversity, for the
national law is paramount and supercedes all state laws as to the
rights and liabilities and exemptions created by such transactions. 34
The Adams Express court held with respect to the carrier's contrac-
tual liability to the shipper that the ICA's preemptive scope is com-
prehensive because of its general nature:
That the legislation supercedes all the regulations and policies of a
particular state upon the same subject results from its general char-
acter. It embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier under a
bill of lading which he must issue, and limits his power to exempt
himself by rule, regulation or contract. Almost every detail of the
30. Id. at 199-200, 206 (emphasis added).
31. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
32. 226 U.S. 491.
33. Id. at 505 (emphasis added) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw Bros., 63 S.E. 865, 870, 5 Ga.
App. 675, 687 (Ct. App. 1909)).
34. Id. (emphasis added).
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subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt
but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject, and
supercede all state regulation with reference to it. 35
Adams Express explained the close relationship between Carmack's
uniform liability standard and its complete preemption of state law:
To hold that the liability [of a carrier under a bill of lading] therein
declared may be increased or diminished by local regulation or local
views of public policy will either make the provision less than su-
preme, or indicate that Congress has not shown a purpose to take
possession of the subject. The first would be unthinkable, and the
latter would be to revert to the uncertainties and diversities of rul-
ings which led to the [Carmack] amendment. The duty to issue a bill
of lading, and the liability thereby assumed, are covered in full, and
though there is no reference to the effect upon state regulation, it is
evident that Congress intended to adopt a uniform rule and relieve
such contracts from the diverse regulation to which they had been
theretofore subject.
What is the liability imposed on the carrier? It is a liability to any
holder of the bill of lading . . . 'for any loss, damage, or injury to
such property caused by it' . . . The liability thus imposed is limited
to 'any loss, injury, or damage caused by it'... and plainly implies a
liability for some default in its common-law duty as a common
carrier. 36
Adams Express established the bedrock principles that under Car-
mack: (1) the interstate carrier's liability under its bill of lading is lim-
ited to the actual loss or damage to the goods; and (2) the carrier's
liability is limited with respect to any default in its common law duty
to the shipper. In other words, Adams Express did not merely hold
that Carmack authorizes shippers and carriers to limit the carrier's
liability to a sum stipulated in the bill of lading. Rather, Adams Ex-
press held that Carmack established a uniform national standard of
maximum carrier liability measured by the actual loss or damage to
the property.
Adams Express also held that the ICA's proviso 3 7 saving to the
shipper its common law rights and remedies ("savings clause") must
be interpreted to mean only the shipper's rights under federal law, not
state law. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, saving the shipper's state
law remedies would "maintain the confusion of the diverse regulation
35. Id. at 505-506 (emphasis added).
36. Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 506-07 (emphasis added).




which it was the purpose of Congress to put an end to."' 38 It was quite
obvious to the Court that "the act cannot be said to destroy itself. '39
4. Preemption of Remedy-Enlarging State Laws
The Supreme Court's application of the principles set out in Adams
Express has remained consistent. In Charleston & Western Carolina
Railway Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co.,40 the Supreme Court struck
down a South Carolina statute imposing a $50 penalty on any carrier
that failed to notify a shipper within 40 days of delivery of the circum-
stances of damage to goods and pay the shipper's claim.41 Writing for
a unanimous bench, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that, al-
though the state law "overlaps the Federal act in respect of... the ex-
tent of [carrier] liability for loss", the state law improperly increased
the carrier's liability "by a fine difficult to escape. '42
The Court expressly held that post-shipment claim handling by an
interstate carrier falls within Carmack's purview. 43 Consequently, the
South Carolina penalty was an unlawful interference with federal
authority:
The penalty ... was exacted for a failure to pay both claims, within
forty days, irrespective of the question whether adequate investiga-
tion had been possible, as required by the Interstate Commerce
Commission's rulings...
The state law was not contrived in aid of the policy of Congress, but
to enforce a state policy differently conceived; and the fine of $50 is
enough to constitute a burden [citation omitted]. But that is immate-
rial. When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in
hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is
not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Con-
gress has seen fit to go. [citations omitted]. The legislation is not
saved by calling it an exercise of the police power, or by the proviso
in the Carmack Amendment saving the rights of holders of bills of
lading under existing law [citation omitted].44
Carmack's conflict with the South Carolina law at issue in Varnville
plainly foreshadowed Carmack's many collisions with state consumer
acts and other local laws in the years to come. Justice Holmes's opin-
ion served notice that state law may not be used to punish an inter-
38. Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 507.
39. Id.
40. 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 603.
43. Id. at 603-04.
44. Varnville, 237 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added).
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state carrier's post-shipment claim handling through the imposition of
fines that are in addition to the carrier's "extent of liability" 45 estab-
lished in Carmack. Under Varnville, Carmack's exclusive "actual
loss" liability standard extends to the carrier's claim adjusting and the
states may not "help" regulate that conduct with their own laws.46 In
sum, Varnville held that state statutes are preempted by the Carmack
Amendment if they "'in any way enlarge the responsibility of the car-
rier' for loss or 'at all affect the ground of recovery, or the measure of
recovery.' "4 7
Although Varnville declared a $50 fine against a carrier under South
Carolina law to be an excessive burden on interstate commerce, just
one year earlier, in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Harris ,'48
the Supreme Court held that Carmack did not bar a $20 attorney fee
award to a shipper under Texas law. In Harris, the Court reasoned
that the attorney fee award did not increase the carrier's liability for
loss of the goods and "only incidentally affects the remedy for enforc-
ing that responsibility. '49
Harris has been cited as authority for the contention that awarding
shippers punitive damages under state consumer laws for "carrier re-
calcitrance" in the claim process does not clash with Carmack because
such state laws do not govern loss or damage to the goods. 50 This
reading of Harris, however, overlooks that part of the Court's decision
explicitly rejecting the imposition of a penalty on the carrier. Harris
upheld the Texas law authorizing attorneys' fees because f'it imposes
not a penalty, but a compensatory allowance" to the shipper of only "a
moderate increment" in suit costs.5 t
The Supreme Court's decisions during the next several years after
Varnville expanded the principle that Carmack completely preempts
all state law that might otherwise increase an interstate carrier's liabil-
ity under its bill of lading. In Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway
45. Id. at 603.
46. Id. at 603-04.
47. Id.
48. 234 U.S. 412 (1914).
49. Id. at 420. See also A.T. Clayton & Co. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 901 F.2d 833,
835 (10th Cir. 1990) (attorney fee award against a carrier under state law upheld as an "inciden-
tal compensatory allowance").
50. Jeanne Kaiser, Moving Violations: An Examination of the Broad Preemptive Effect of the
Carmack Amendment, 20 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 289, 307 (1998).
51. Harris, 234 U.S. at 421. The consumerist theory that punitive damages may be used to
enforce the carrier's Carmack duties was similarly rejected by the Second Circuit on the ground
that punitive awards "could have a dramatic impact on a carrier's liability and seriously enlarge a
shipper's remedy." Cleveland v. Beltman N. Am. Co., 30 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Co. v. Blish Milling Co.52 the Court held that Carmack is "comprehen-
sive enough to embrace responsibility for all losses resulting from any
failure to discharge a carrier's duty as to any part of the agreed trans-
portation... -153 In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Stroud54 the Court
declared, "[T]here can be no divided authority over interstate com-
merce and ... the acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and
exclusive. '55 Two years later the Court held in Missouri Pacific Rail-
road Co. v. Porter,56 with respect to Carmack, that "Congress must be
deemed to have determined that the rule laid down and the means
provided to enforce it are sufficient and that no other regulation is
necessary. 57
Quoting Blish Milling, the Court held in Southeastern Express Co. v.
Pastime Amusement Co.58 that the ICA's mission was to establish rea-
sonable and uniform interstate freight rates and a consistent national
standard so that carriers can predict their risks and liabilities in setting
rates:
The words of the [Carmack Amendment] 'are comprehensive
enough to embrace all damages resulting from any failure to dis-
charge a carrier's duty with respect to any part of the transportation
to the agreed destination' . . . The underlying principle is that the
carrier is entitled to base rates upon value and that its compensation
should bear a reasonable relation to the risk and responsibility as-
sumed. The broad purpose of the federal act is to compel the estab-
lishment of reasonable rates and to provide for their uniform
application.59
Since Carmack's enactment in 1906, the Supreme Court has gener-
ally held that federal law excludes all other rights and remedies with
respect to interstate transportation agreements. 60 Moreover, the car-
rier's rights and obligations defined by its published tariff cannot be
enlarged by any alleged tort of the carrier.61
52. 241 U.S. 190 (1916).
53. Id. at 196.
54. 267 U.S. 404 (1925).
55. Id. at 408.
56. 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
57. Id. at 345-46.
58. 299 U.S. 28 (1936).
59. Id. at 29. See also Vaigneur v. W. Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 92, 93 (E.D. Tenn. 1940)
(dismissing emotional distress claims as preempted by federal law meant to establish uniform
rates).
60. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983).
61. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 126 (1990); Keogh v. Chicago
& Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922).
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A small minority of courts and commentators62 have opined that
Carmack was not intended to completely preempt state law remedies
for unfair claim handling and other alleged carrier misconduct. This
theory is usually based on the narrow premise that some carrier con-
duct is not directly related to the actual movement of the goods or
their physical loss or damage. Such a blinkered view of Carmack,
however, does not square with ICCTA's broad definition of "trans-
portation" 63 and its explicit preemption of state law with respect to all
interstate carrier "services. '64 The "ordinary," or limited, preemption
interpretation of Carmack often relies on faulty parallels between
ICCTA and other federal laws that, unlike Carmack, do not prescribe
specific remedies for violations of federal standards. 65 As set forth in
Adams Express and the long line of federal appellate and trial court
decisions that follow it, Carmack does provide the exclusive remedy
for a shipper suing the carrier for any breach of the bill of lading
agreement causing loss, damage or delay of the goods.
III. ICA's COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATIVE AND
REGULATORY SCHEMES
ICCTA is among the most comprehensive legislative and regulatory
schemes that Congress has ever enacted. 66 Carmack supplants all
other rules of obligation with respect to interstate shipments. 67 The
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA") regula-
tions68 govern interstate motor carrier claims handling and ICCTA
prescribes a $500 per day civil penalty for a violation of the FMCSA's
regulations, if no other civil penalty is applicable. 69 Federal agency
regulations have the same preemptive effect as federal statutes. 70
Therefore, interstate carrier conduct governed by federal agency regu-
lations is not ordinarily subject to liability under state law. The Su-
62. See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note 50, at 295, 297, 303.
63. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(19) (2002).
64. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (2002). See discussion infra Part 1Il.
65. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (federal statute governing medical
devices, but not providing a private remedy, held not to preempt state product liability claim);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (federal regulations governing nuclear plant
safety, but not providing a private remedy, held not to preempt state law claims for personal
injury and property damage).
66. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318, 321 (1981)
("The breadth of the [ICC's] statutory discretion suggests a Congressional intent to limit judicial
interference with the agency's work.").
67. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983).
68. 49 C.F.R. §370 (2002).
69. 49 U.S.C. § 14910 (2002).
70. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
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preme Court has held that federal regulatory "pre-emption will lie
only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject mat-
ter of the relevant state law."'71 As discussed below, the federal regu-
lations governing interstate carriers' contractual and claim-handling
activities leave no room for states' laws to interfere.
A. ICCTA's Broad Definition of "Transportation"
ICCTA defines regulated "transportation" to mean not only the ac-
tual physical movement of property, but all carrier services related to
the movement. These services include, but are not limited to, arrang-
ing for, receipt, delivery, transfer, storage, handling, packing, unpack-
ing and interchange of the property. 72 ICCTA further provides that a
state may not enact or enforce any law relating to a motor carrier's
price, route or service with respect to the interstate transportation of
property.73 ICCTA's expansive definition of regulated "transporta-
tion" and its express preemption of state law with respect to any car-
rier "service" clearly reflect the supremacy of federal over state law in
the area of interstate transportation.7 4
B. The FMCSA's Comprehensive Regulations
The FMCSA's regulations accompanying ICCTA govern the entire
transaction between the shipper and interstate carrier. Shippers' and
carriers' regulated activities include the following:
(1) Pre-contract information, documents and carrier conduct (49
C.F.R. §§375.2-375.6, 375.11, 375.17);
(2) Furnishing binding/non-binding estimates (49 C.F.R. §375.3(a)
and (b));
(3) Order for service (49 C.F.R. §375.5);
(4) Issuance of bill of lading (49 C.F.R. §375.6);
(5) Non-assumption of carrier liability in excess of bill of lading
limitations (49 C.F.R. §375.12);
(6) Sale of insurance to shipper (49 C.F.R. §375.11);
(7) Restrictions on carrier advertising (49 C.F.R. §375.17);
(8) Processing of shipper cargo claims (49 U.S.C. §14706 and 49
C.F.R. § 370);
(9) Processing of shipper overcharge claims (49 C.F.R. §378);
71. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993); see also Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (federal regulations governing adequacy of railroad crossing warn-
ing devices held to preempt state law).
72. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(19) (2002).
73. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (2002).
74. See Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. UPS, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 665, 668 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (Con-
gress intended Section 14501(c) to have same broad preemptive effect as the Airline Deregula-
tion Act).
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(10) Filing of shippers' complaints against carriers with the FMCSA
(49 U.S.C. §13907(c)(1));
(11) Civil and criminal penalties against carriers for violations of
ICCTA and FMCSA regulations (49 U.S.C. §§14901(e);
14914).
The comprehensive, detailed statutory and regulatory framework
governing interstate carrier transportation services, including claim
processing, manifests an obvious congressional intent to regulate all
carrier commercial conduct to the exclusion of state statutes and
regulations.
IV. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS ON
CARMACK PREEMPTION
A. A Case Chronology
In 1981 the Tenth Circuit held that, under the ICA's savings
clause, 75 the plaintiff could assert common and state law claims
against the carrier for "reckless" handling of the goods and "dilatory"
processing of the plaintiff's damage claim.76 Eight years later, the
Tenth Circuit overruled that decision in Underwriters at Lloyd's of
London v. North American Van Lines, Inc.77 and rejected the savings
clause as authority for tort claims against a carrier for breach of the
bill of lading contract. 78 After considering the Supreme Court's rul-
ings on Carmack and the savings clause, the Court of Appeals
declared:
[T]he Supreme Court and other authorities have described the Car-
mack Amendment in broad, preemptive terms, and have relegated
the proviso [Section 10103] relating to other remedies to a category
of almost total insignificance. 79
The Tenth Circuit held that the savings clause preserves only those
common law shipper rights that are consistent with ICA. The Court
further held in Underwriters at Lloyd's that Carmack provides the sole
remedy for any loss resulting from breach of the carrier's duty under a
transportation agreement and there can be no tort cause of action for
the same breach. 80
75. 49 U.S.C. § 15103 (2002) (amending 49 U.S.C. § 10103 (1995)).
76. Reed v. Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc., 637 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1981).
77. 890 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1989).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1116. Accord Ting-Hwa Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd., 986 F.2d 700, 705-06 (4th
Cir. 1993); Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1413-14 (7th Cir. 1987); Wirth, Ltd.
v. Silvretta, 575 F. Supp. 1274, 1277 n.1 (N.D. Il. 1984).
80. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 890 F.2d at 1119-1120.
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Several other United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have held
that Carmack's actual loss liability standard broadly applies to the car-
rier's pre-shipment contract negotiations and post-shipment claim
handling. In Hopper Furs, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp.,81 the
Eighth Circuit held:
All actions against a common carrier, whether designated as tort or
contract actions, are governed by the federal statute, and "no recov-
ery can be had in excess of the amount permitted by [the] terms" of
the contract.8 2
In Hughes v. United Van Lines,83 the plaintiffs asserted state claims
against the carrier for negligence, conversion and negligent infliction
of emotional distress as a result of fire damage to their household
goods. The plaintiffs also alleged state claims for misrepresentation
and breach of "insurance" contract in connection with the parties' re-
leased valuation agreement in the bill of lading.84 Affirming the dis-
missal of the state claims, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
with respect to Carmack:
The purpose of this statute is to establish uniform federal guidelines
designed in part to remove the uncertainty surrounding a carrier's
liability when damage occurs to a shipper's interstate shipment. To
permit a shipper to choose among various types of remedies would
cause confusion and insurmountable problems and defeat the Act's
purpose of eliminating uncertainty as to a carrier's liability by in-
jecting uncertainty back into this area of transportation Congress
has sought to regulate. 85
In Salzstein v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc.,86 the Fifth Circuit held that
Carmack and the ICC's regulations govern carrier claim processing to
the exclusion of state law.87 Soon after its decision in Salzstein, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of numerous state law claims
against a carrier, including emotional distress, deceptive trade prac-
tices and unfair claim handling.88 In Moffitt v. Bekins Moving & Stor-
age,89 the District Court held that Carmack "has long been held to
preempt state law causes of action arising from or related to [the]
move" and that any legal duty on the part of the carrier "arose solely
81. 749 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1984).
82. Id. at 1264.
83. 829 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913 (1988).
84. Id. at 1412 n.5.
85. Id. at 1415. See also Intech, Inc. v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 836 F.2d 672, 677 (1st Cir.
1987) (emphasis added) (Carmack provides exclusive remedy for "damages incidental to" car-
rier's breach of contractual duty).
86. 993 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1993).
87. Id. at 1189.
88. Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1993).
89. 818 F. Supp. 178 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
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out of" the carrier's order for service and bill of lading.90 Affirming
on preemption grounds, the Fifth Circuit held that allowing the plain-
tiffs to pursue their state law claims "could only lead to the morass that
existed before the Carmack Amendment," whose purpose "was to cre-
ate uniformity out of disparity." 91
A year later, the Second Circuit again examined Carmack's uniform
liability scheme in Cleveland v. Beltman North American Co., Inc.92
The plaintiffs asserted a federal common law count against a carrier
for alleged breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing in handling a claim for damage to their household goods.9 3 After
trial in the District Court, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $28,000 in
compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages. 94 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the punitive award, but found little gui-
dance in the cases involving Carmack preemption of state law claims
because the District Court's award was purportedly based on federal
common law.95 The Court defined the relevant issue as whether a
claim for punitive relief "substantively enlarges the carrier's responsi-
bility for the loss. '' 96 Cleveland held that punitive damages were not
preserved as a federal common law remedy under the savings clause
in former Section 10103 because they conflict with Carmack's uniform
liability standard. 97
Cleveland rejected the notion that judicially created federal com-
mon law can supplement Carmack:
[I]n the context of interstate commerce, Congress has spoken di-
rectly and comprehensively, creating no need to develop rights judi-
cially to ensure that Congress' aim is fulfilled.
Consequently, because the issue of a shipper's compensation for ac-
tual loss or injury to its property has been comprehensively and di-
rectly addressed by the Carmack Amendment, a federal common
90. Id. at 180-81.
91. Moffit, 6 F.3d at 307.
92. 30 F. 3d 373 (2d Cir. 1994).
93. Id. at 376.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 377-81.
96. Cleveland, 30 F.3d at 379.
97. Id. (noting that "[als simply evidenced by the verdict in this case, punitive damage awards
could have a dramatic impact on a carrier's liability and seriously enlarge a shipper's remedy. A
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing resulting in an award of
punitive damages could well thwart one of the primary purposes of the Carmack Amendment;
that is, to provide some uniformity in the disposition of claims brought under a bill of lading.
Because the availability of punitive damages would frustrate the uniformity goal of the Carmack




law cause of action - even assuming such exists - is displaced by
the Act that has established those remedies Congress deems appro-
priate in this field.98
The Cleveland panel recognized that where Congress has "compre-
hensively" addressed the issue of the carrier's liability in Carmack's
"actual loss" standard, the further imposition of punitive damages
against the carrier would nullify that standard.99
Cleveland was preceded by another decision four months earlier in
which the Tenth Circuit denied exemplary relief under another section
of the ICA. In Overbrook Farmers Union Cooperative Association v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.100 the Court held that punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable for a railroad's alleged failure to maintain
service:
The ICC has set its face against punitive damages for violations of
the [Interstate Commerce] Act [citation omitted].
A number of Supreme Court decisions and ICC determinations
limit, by way of dicta, carrier liability to actual damages for rate
violations remedied by 49 U.S.C. § 11705(b) (formerly § 8) [cita-
tions omitted].
[W]e are unpersuaded that punitive damages are available for a
§ 11101(a) service violation under the § 10103 savings clause. The
Supreme Court has determined that § 11705 remedies are solely
compensatory .... 01
In 1997, the First Circuit handed down a significant decision on the
scope of Carmack preemption in Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc.102
Since the Rini case has prompted the introduction of the MCRA in
Congress, its facts and holding deserve close scrutiny. The plaintiff
booked an interstate shipment of her household goods with the carrier
and declared a total released valuation of $60,000 on the carrier's bill
of lading. 10 3 At destination, the plaintiff signed the carrier's delivery
inventories without exceptions, but reported the next day that she was
unable to locate eleven pieces of artwork.10 4 A month later, the plain-
tiff submitted an unsupported written claim to the carrier for
$134,000-an amount she acknowledged was a "guesstimate".1 0 5 A
year after the shipment, the plaintiff provided the carrier with two
98. Id. at 380-81.
99. Id. at 381.
100. 21 F.3d 360 (10th Cir. 1994).
101. Id. at 364.
102. 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir. 1997).
103. Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 234, 236 (D. Mass. 1995).
104. Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 224, 226-27 (D. Mass. 1995).
105. Id. at 227.
2003]
194 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
appraisals totaling $57,000 for six of the eleven allegedly missing
items. 10 6 The plaintiff rejected the carrier's offer to submit the dispute
to the American Arbitration Association. 10 7 Ten months after the car-
rier offered to arbitrate, the plaintiff's attorney wrote to the carrier
demanding $120,000 (double the $60,000.00 declared valuation for the
entire shipment) and advising of the plaintiff's intention to sue for
treble damages and attorney's fees under Massachusetts General
Laws Chapter 93A, the state's deceptive trade practices act.10 8
In her suit against the carrier, the plaintiff alleged state claims for
negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and violation of Chapter 93A, in addition to a Carmack
claim.10 9 After the plaintiff's suit was tried before a jury, she was
awarded $50,000 for her property loss. 110 The plaintiff and carrier
were held 30% percent and 70% percent negligent, respectively, in
the conduct of the claim process."' 1 The jury awarded the plaintiff an
additional $100,000 in damages on her claim for the carrier's alleged
intentional misrepresentations during the claim process, although
there was no specific evidence of any additional monetary loss during
that process. 112 The jury denied the plaintiff recovery on her claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress." 3 Applying Chapter 93A,
the trial judge trebled the plaintiff's $100,000 non-Carmack award for
alleged claim misrepresentation to $300,000 and awarded plaintiff
$146,950 in attorneys' fees, $7,359.60 in costs, and $100,000.00 in pre-
judgment interest, for a total judgment of $604,309.60.1 a The final
judgment increased by more than 12-fold the jury's award of $50,000
to the plaintiff in actual damages liability under the bill of lading. The
final judgment against the carrier was more than 10 times the $60,000
released value declared on the bill of lading by the plaintiff for all her
goods.
In its examination of the carrier's appeal, the First Circuit, citing
Varnville and Cleveland, reversed and held that Carmack preempts
any state law increasing the liability of the carrier for loss or damage
and affecting the ground or measure of recovery." 15 The Court of Ap-
106. Background information provided by defendant.
107. Rini, 903 F. Supp. at 229 & n.4 (noting that United only informed Rini of the existence of
United's arbitration program).
108. Background information provided by defendant.
109. Rini, 903 F. Supp. at 225.
110. Id. at 231.
111. Id. at 231 n.5.
112. Id. at 231.
113. Rini, 903 F. Supp. at 231.
114. Id. at 233-34, 239.
115. Rini, 104 F.3d at 505-07.
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peals further noted that Carmack and its accompanying regulations
govern both the transportation of goods and the claim process.116 The
Rini panel, in dicta, suggested a narrow hypothetical exception to Car-
mack preemption where the shipper alleges an injury "independent
from the loss or damage to goods" such as assault or intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, although the Rini jury rejected the plain-
tiff's latter cause of action. 117
In its dicta, the Rini decision sought to strike a balance between
"protecting the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over the
shipper-carrier relationship," 118 which includes the claim process, and
preserving the shipper's rights in situations where a carrier's inten-
tional misconduct may cause physical or severe emotional injury to
the shipper that is unrelated to the carrier's transportation of the
goods or handling of the shipper's claim. To the extent, however, that
Rini's dicta has been misconstrued by some as authorizing shipper
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and other torts
arising solely from the carrier's handling of the goods or the claim
process, such a reading of Rini is contrary to its actual holding, which
affirmed Carmack's preemption of any state law purporting to enlarge
a carrier's liability for breach of the bill of lading.
In Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc.," 9 the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of state law claims against the carrier for alleged fraudu-
lent procurement of the transportation agreement and bad faith claim
handling. Relying on Rini, the Seventh Circuit held that "the claims
process is directly related to the loss or damage to the goods that were
shipped. Indeed, people would not be involved in the process unless
either loss or damage had occurred.' 20 Further citing the Rini dicta,
however, Gordon held that the plaintiffs' claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, which Rini apparently inspired, was not
preempted and remanded that claim for further proceedings. 12'
In Gordon, the Seventh Circuit cited its prior decision in North
American Van Lines, Inc. v. Pinkerton Sec. Systems, Inc. 122 for the
principle that intentional infliction of emotional distress is "separate
and distinct" from damage to the goods.123 Pinkerton, however, relied
116. Id. at 505.
117. Id. at 506.
118. Id. at 507.
119. 130 F. 3d 282 (7th Cir. 1997).
120. Id. at 290.
121. Id. at 289-90.
122. 89 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 1996).
123. Id. at 289.
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on two lower court cases that were expressly overruled by Rini.)14
Thus, both Gordon and Pinkerton are of questionable precedential
value on this issue. Similar to Rini, Gordon offers no guidance as to
what kind of carrier conduct is sufficiently egregious and divorced
from the carrier's broadly defined transportation services to be action-
able for emotional distress.
In Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc.,125 the Fifth Circuit re-
visited the recoverability of emotional damages. The plaintiffs sued
the carrier for punitive damages, lost wages and mental anguish after
their shipment was destroyed in a truck fire.12 6 The Fifth Circuit, con-
curring with Cleveland and Gordon, held that "federal common law
remedies preserved by the savings clause can afford no greater relief
than provided by [former] section 11707.127 Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff's claims for compensatory, emotional
and punitive damages based on the carrier's alleged "egregious con-
duct in the course of discharging its duties under the shipping con-
tract" were preempted. 12 8
The Eleventh Circuit recently joined the majority of United States
Courts of Appeals through its adoption of a broad view of Carmack
preemption in Smith v. United Parcel Service.12 9 Significantly, Smith
did not involve a claim for actual loss or damage to goods, but rather,
the carrier's alleged failure to provide service to the plaintiffs. 130 UPS
refused to continue regular deliveries to the plaintiffs after one of
them called a driver "an unflattering and derogatory name. 1 31 After
the incident, UPS held the plaintiffs' packages for irregular deliveries
by other drivers under "will call" notices mailed to the plaintiffs. 132
One of the plaintiffs, however, was legally blind and unable to read
the notices, which resulted in some packages being returned to the
senders.133 The plaintiffs sued UPS and its driver alleging fraud, negli-
gence, wantonness, outrage, discrimination and conspiracy, to which
the defendants asserted the defense of Carmack preemption. 34
124. See Mesta v. Allied Van Lines Int'l, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 63 (D. Mass. 1988); Sokhos v.
Mayflower Transit, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1578 (D. Mass. 1988); Rini, 104 F.3d at 506 n.3.
125. 144 F. 3d 377 (5th Cir. 1998).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 382.
128. Id. at 383.
129. 296 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2002).
130. Id. at 1247.
131. Id. at 1245.
132. Id.
133. Smith, 296 F.3d at 1245-46.
134. Id. at 1246.
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Affirming the District Court's dismissal of the case, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected the savings clause (Section 15103) as a basis for the
plaintiffs' state law claims against UPS.135 Moving to the core of its
holding, the Court of Appeals stated that only "conduct separate and
distinct from the delivery, loss of, or damage to goods escape preemp-
tion. ' 136 The Court further explained, "separate and distinct conduct
rather than injury must exist for a claim to fall outside the preemptive
scope of the Carmack Amendment." 137 As the carrier's purported
misconduct was its failure to deliver goods, the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that none of the plaintiffs' state law claims were actionable. 138
Smith correctly held that the carrier's contractual or service-related
conduct is the litmus test for Carmack preemption and rejected an
illusory preemption standard based on the plaintiff's denomination of
his claim for injury or the alleged severity of the carrier's acts.
B. The Misuse of Rini's Dicta
What started out as a purely hypothetical proposition by the First
Circuit in Rini has, in a few cases, become a means of evading negoti-
ated contractual liability limits, Carmack's "actual loss" standard and
Carmack federal subject matter jurisdiction.139 Taking a cue from
Rini's dicta, the plaintiffs in Gordon and several subsequent cases as-
serted mental anguish claims against carriers to circumvent stipulated
bill of lading liability limitations or avoid federal jurisdiction over
their suits. In suggesting that a claim for severe emotional distress can
give a shipper an additional source of damages beyond the actual loss
to the goods, where the carrier's conduct amounts to no more than a
contractual failure to provide agreed transportation services, Rini's
dicta and Gordon err in disregarding the scope of Carmack preemp-
tion established by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, Rini's dicta
poses a hypothetical situation that is irrelevant to the vast majority of
shipper-carrier disputes.
In short, Rini's dicta and Gordon disregard the Supreme Court's
ruling in Adams Express, which held that Carmack fully covers the
carrier's liability for any "default in its common-law duty as a common
carrier," which was intended to end the "diverse regulation" of the
states.1 40 They further disregard Varnville's holding that state law may
135. Id. at 1246-49.
136. Id. at 1249.
137. Smith, 296 F.3d at 1249.
138. Id.
139. See cases discussed infra Part V.B.
140. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913).
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not enlarge the ground or measure of recovery against the carrier
under the bill of lading. They also disregard Blish Milling's holding
that Carmack comprehensively covers the carrier's liability for "all
losses resulting from any failure" to perform the transportation agree-
ment. 141 According Carmack complete preemptive effect on state law
is essential to establishing reasonable uniform rates for interstate
transportation services.142
C. The Viability of Rini-Type Mental Distress and Other Tort
Claims for Carrier Contractual Conduct
Shipper attempts to avoid carrier bill of lading limitations of liabil-
ity with emotional distress claims are often flawed. Short of having a
carrier's employee commit a criminal act, it is difficult to envision con-
duct so far removed from the transportation services and claim pro-
cess that it would fall outside the carrier's normal contractual
obligations under the bill of lading. Moreover, intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress is not actionable under most state laws for
ordinary offensive conduct and the usual subjective reactions to it. 143
Thus, the twin elements of extreme willful misconduct and seriously
debilitating emotional injury necessary to prove intentional infliction
of emotional distress are rarely, if ever, found in situations involving
only a carrier's loss of or damage to property, or mere rudeness or
failure to pay a claim as demanded. In any event, the debate over
shipper emotional distress claims, which Rini's dicta and Gordon
prompted, still remains an academic one. To date, no reported case
has yet held an interstate motor carrier liable to a shipper for inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm for the mere handling of goods or a
claim.
V. LOWER COURT DECISIONS ON CARMACK PREEMPTION
A. Cases Upholding Carmack Preemption
The scope of Carmack preemption has been frequently examined in
federal and state trial court opinions. All but a handful of courts have
held that Carmack's uniform "actual damages" liability standard
preempts punitive claims under state consumer fraud and deceptive
trade practices acts arising from loss or damage to goods in transit, as
141. Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 196 (1916).
142. Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28, 29 (1936).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. (1965) (elements of intentional infliction of




well as from the carrier's pre-shipment and post-shipment services re-
lated to the actual transportation. Other courts have held that emo-
tional distress claims are similarly preempted insofar as they are based
on the carrier's contractual duties and conduct under the bill of lading.
1. Consumer Fraud and Other State Law Claims
The decision of state legislatures to enact consumer fraud and de-
ceptive trade practices statutes, beginning in the 1960's, inevitably led
to shippers' suits that sought to apply these laws to interstate carriers
in cases involving transportation of goods. By and large, the federal
and state courts have dismissed such claims against carriers on pre-
emption grounds in many states, including Colorado, 144 Connecti-
cut, 145 Florida, 146 Georgia, 147 Idaho, 148 Illinois, 149 Maryland, 150 New
Jersey,151 New Mexico, 52 North Carolina, 53 South Carolina, 154
144. Suarez v. United Van Lines, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 815 (D. Colo. 1992). (Colorado Deceptive
Trade Practices Act claim held preempted as conflicting with ICA's purpose of enabling carriers
to assess their risks and potential claims liability).
145. C&M Tech., Inc. v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. CV554356S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2552, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2001) (Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act claim
alleging carrier's fraudulent alteration of delivery receipt to omit cargo damage held preempted
as relating to carrier "service").
146. Circle Redmont, Inc. v. Mercer Transp. Co., No. 5D00-3354, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS
13589, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2001) (Florida law claim for conversion due to carrier's
failure to collect COD charges held preempted by Carmack).
147. Hull v. United Van Lines, L.L.C., No. 402CV133 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2003) (claim against
carrier under Georgia Deceptive Trade Practices Act alleging misrepresentation of services held
preempted).
148. Schultz v. Auld, 848 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Idaho 1993) (Idaho Consumer Protection Act
claim held preempted).
149. Pierre v. UPS, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (suit under Illinois Consumer
Fraud & Deceptive Business Practices Act alleging pre-shipment carrier misrepresentation dis-
missed as preempted); Nowakowski v. Am. Red Ball Transit Co., 680 N.E.2d 441 (I11. App. Ct.
1997) (Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claim alleging carrier's fraud in insuring goods held
preempted).
150. Richter v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 406 (D. Md. 2000) (Maryland Con-
sumer Protection Act claim held preempted).
151. Orlick v. J.D. Carton & Son, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 337, 345 (D.N.J. 2001) (New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act claim held preempted by Carmack because all claims "arise from the con-
tractual relationship"); Indus. Risk Ins. v. UPS, 746 A.2d 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(Carmack scope not limited to period when goods are "on the highway" and applies to the
carrier's "entire body of services" related to transportation.).
152. Margetson v. United Van Lines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 917 (D.N.M. 1991) (New Mexico Un-
fair Trade Practice Act claim alleging pre-shipment carrier misrepresentation held preempted).
153. Taylor v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 509 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (North Carolina
Deceptive Trade Practices Act count alleging improper claim handling held preempted); accord
Werner v. Lawrence Transp. Sys., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
154. Carr v. United Van Lines, Inc., 345 S.E.2d 734 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (South Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act count alleging unfair claims handling held preempted by ICA, car-
rier's ICC-filed tariffs and ICC claim regulations).
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Tennessee 155 and Texas. 156
Two of the federal court decisions upholding Carmack preemption
are instructive. In Margetson v. United Van Lines, Inc.,157 the plaintiff
sued the carrier alleging that her move was not performed in accor-
dance with the carrier's promises prior to the shipment. 158 The plain-
tiff demanded punitive damages for the carrier's alleged fraud,
recklessness and violation of state deceptive trade practices laws. 159
The New Mexico District Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that
Carmack applies only to the carrier's conduct during the actual trans-
portation and held that Carmack applied to all ". . .services generally
performed by a common carrier . "160 The Court further held that
the imposition of punitive damages with respect to such services
would frustrate the legislative intent of the Carmack Amendment.1 61
In Schultz v. Auld, the Idaho District Court dismissed the plaintiff's
claim against the carrier under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act as
preempted. 162 Interestingly, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that Carmack did not preempt state consumer law because Con-
gress did not regulate the field of consumer protection in 1906 when it
enacted the Carmack Amendment.1 63 The Court reasoned that apply-
ing state consumer law to interstate carrier conduct would be "totally
incongruous with the purposes of the Carmack Amendment. ' ' 164 The
Court's reasoning on this important point merits full recital:
[I]f this Court were to adopt Plaintiff's position, the uniformity and
certainty of the national scheme would be compromised. The posi-
tion asserted by Plaintiff would enable one moving from any state to
the State of Idaho to proceed under the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act. Such a rule would create an entirely new scheme of potential
liability for a carrier, as the right to assert additional causes of ac-
tion would fortuitously depend on from where or to where the ship-
per moved. It is not difficult to imagine that every suit brought
against a carrier of household goods would include allegations of
intentional conduct or fraud in an effort to avoid the preemptive
155. Malone v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Tenn. 1993) (claims under
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and bad faith statute dismissed).
156. Hanlon v. UPS, 132 F. Supp. 2d 503 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (shipper claims under Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act for bad faith, emotional distress and insurance fraud held preempted);
accord Margetson, 785 F. Supp. 917.
157. Margetson, 785 F. Supp. 917.
158. Id. at 918.
159. Id. at 918-19.
160. Id. at 920.
161. Margetson, 785 F. Supp. at 921; see also White v. United Van Lines, Inc., 758 F. Supp.
1240 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (claim for carrier bad faith handling held preempted by Carmack).
162. Schultz, 848 F. Supp. at 1497.




effect of the Carmack Amendment. Moreover, to account for in-
creased liabilities occasioned by the exception, carriers would neces-
sarily be required to increase their rates, thus further defeating
congressional policy to encourage reasonable rates for
transportation. 165
2. Emotional Distress Cases
In Rockholt v. United Van Lines,166 the Idaho District Court, citing
Carmack's preemption of the action, dismissed the plaintiff's claims
against the carrier for emotional distress and punitive damages. 167
The Court reviewed Supreme Court and federal appellate court
precedents to conclude that such claims are incompatible with Car-
mack's "limited liability" standard as defined in Adams Express.1 68
The Maryland District Court's decision in Richter v. North Ameri-
can Van Lines169 provides an instructive analysis of a plaintiff's claim
against the carrier for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
Court refrained from deciding whether Carmack preempted the emo-
tional distress claim and held that the carrier's conduct was not "op-
probrious," so as to be actionable under state law. 170 The Court
observed that there is almost always some mental vexation of the
plaintiff with any contractual breach and that allowing mental distress
claims in interstate transportation cases could be "paralyzing to
commerce.,
171
In Hull v. United Van Lines172 a Georgia federal court, following the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Smith v. UPS,173 recently dismissed as
preempted the plaintiff's state law claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on the carrier's alleged mishandling of her
goods and purported attempt to conceal the damage. Applying the
Eleventh Circuit's conduct-based preemption test, Hull held ". .. it
matters not whether an injury is distinct and separate - to one's per-
son, for example, and not to property - if the underlying conduct caus-
165. Id.
166. 697 F. Supp. 383 (D. Idaho 1988).
167. Id. at 386-89.
168. Id. at 387.
169. 110 F. Supp. 2d 406 (D. Md. 2000).
170. Id. at 411-12.
171. Id. at 414 (quoting Hector Martinez & Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106, 109 (5th
Cir. 1979). See also Fields v. Bennett Truck Transp., Inc., No. 98-1177-P-C, 1999 WL 1425403, at
*1 (S.D. Ala. June 4, 1999) (shippers' claim for emotional distress resulting from carrier's alleged
reckless and wanton destruction of goods held preempted).
172. Hull v. United Van Lines, L.L.C., No. 402CV133 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2003).
173. 296 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2002).
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ing the injury is itself not separate and distinct. ' 174 The Court further
reasoned that "the underlying conduct plaintiff alleges is not separate
and distinct from a failure to properly transport and deliver goods...
the allegations of fraud that plaintiff focuses on - as well as her other
factual allegations - simply describe the outrageous manner in which
defendants failed to carry out their duties under the contract. ' 175 Hull
rejected the preemption analysis of a pre-Smith decision by the same
District Court in Hubbard v. All States Relocation Serv., Inc., which is
discussed below.
B. Cases Rejecting Carmack Preemption
Three recent federal court decisions relying on Rini's dicta and
Gordon have taken a narrow view of Carmack preemption and per-
mitted shippers to pursue state law tort claims against carriers directly
relating to the carriers' interstate transportation services. 76
In Hubbard v. All States Relocation Serv., Inc., the plaintiff alleged
claims for "damages to his goods and severe emotional distress."1 7776
In its decision, the Georgia District Court characterizes Carmack's
scope as extending only to "claims for damages to goods. ' 178 Hub-
bard cites Rini and Gordon for the proposition that a claim for dam-
ages for "injuries separate and apart from the loss or damage of
goods" may not be preempted. 179 According to Hubbard, a claim for
injury "to the shipper personally," 180 such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress, is not preempted. The decision, though, does not
recite that the plaintiff presented any facts or allegations suggesting
that his emotional distress claim was based on anything more than the
alleged loss of his property, that is, the carrier's alleged breach of the
bill of lading.
It is unclear whether Hubbard's holding is limited to claims for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress or, as implied in the opinion,
whether the Court considered even alleged negligent infliction of
emotional distress based solely on the carrier's handling of the ship-
per's goods or claim to be free from Carmack preemption. Further-
more, Hubbard's reliance on the Massachusetts District Court's
174. Hull, No. 402CV133, at 3.
175. Id.
176. See Hubbard v. All States Relocation Servs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (S.D. Ga. 2000);
Lamm v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Rosenthal v. United Van
Lines, LLC, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
177. 76 Hubbard, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.
178. Id. at 1377.
179. Id. at 1379.
180. Id. at 1381.
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decisions in Sokhos and Mesta, which the First Circuit expressly over-
ruled in Rini, compromised the ruling's value. 181
Hubbard recites that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Morris182 "does
not explain why the plaintiffs in that case failed to prove a separate
[emotional] injury" that would survive Carmack preemption. 83 Mor-
ris, however, clearly holds that the plaintiffs' mental anguish claim
failed because the alleged emotional suffering was "incurred by the
Morrises as a result of the destruction of their household goods" and
not from any intentional misconduct of the carrier separate from its
contractual duties.1 84 Therefore, Hubbard's reliance on Morris as au-
thority for allowing a claim for mere negligent infliction of emotional
distress is misplaced. Finally, Hubbard's precedential value is highly
doubtful in light of the Eleventh Circuit's subsequent adoption of the
carrier conduct-based preemption test in Smith v. United Parcel
Service.185
In Lamm v. Bekins Van Lines Co.,186 an Alabama federal court con-
sidered the scope of Carmack preemption on the plaintiffs' remand
motion challenging federal removal jurisdiction.187 The Court re-
manded the action to the state court on the ground that Carmack did
not completely preempt the plaintiffs' claims for 'outrage' and emo-
tional distress. 188 The Court held that the plaintiffs asserted a sepa-
rate non-preempted claim for emotional distress as a result of
allegedly "witnessing the [movers'] drunken, brawling behavior that
put their heirlooms at risk" while the goods were being packed for
shipment. 189 The Court reasoned that, because the goods were not
actually damaged during pre-shipment handling, the plaintiffs' out-
rage and emotional distress claims were not preempted. 90 The Court,
however, offered no theory of how the carrier's alleged failure to
properly handle the plaintiffs' goods during packaging could be based
on any legal duty other than a contractual one. Additionally, the
Court did not acknowledge ICCTA's broad statutory definition of
"transportation," which includes all carrier "handling" and "pack-
181. Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 506 n.3 (1st Cir. 1997).
182. Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 1998).
183. Hubbard, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.
184. Morris, 144 F.3d at 383.
185. 296 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2002).
186. 139 F. Supp. 2d 1300.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1312-13.
189. Id. at 1302, 1312-13.
190. Lamm, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1313.
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ing,"'191 in concluding that the plaintiffs had a viable state law claim
based on the carrier's pre-shipment packing of the goods.
Lamm further justified the remand on the possibility that, because
of one of the plaintiffs' active military status, Carmack may not gov-
ern the action.' 92 Lamm, however, contains no specific finding that
Carmack was inapplicable and does not cite any statutory or contrac-
tual provision rendering Carmack inapplicable to that case.
In a puzzling discussion, Lamm dismisses the Supreme Court's 1913
ruling in Adams Express as "anachronistic" because, according to the
Lamm court, the ICA's savings clause at that time was narrower than
its modern recodified version.' 93 The Lamm court, however, does not
explain how any textual evolution of the original savings clause has
made Adams Express outdated or non-binding on the lower courts.
The Lamm decision further contends that the ICA's savings clause
should not be construed as a "nullity.' 94 Lamm, however, disregards
the federal appellate court decisions that correctly follow Adams Ex-
press on this point, including the Tenth Circuit's decision noting that
most courts have relegated the savings clause to a position of "almost
total insignificance." 195
In Rosenthal v. United Van Lines, LLC 196 the plaintiffs asserted va-
rious state law claims against an interstate van line and its disclosed
household goods agents alleging property damage and tort claims di-
rectly stemming from the carrier's transportation services. 197 The
plaintiffs asserted claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and loss of companionship as a result of the carrier's alleged failure to
deliver the goods as agreed. 198 The plaintiffs further averred that the
carrier's moving crew blocked "non-union" workers from completing
the delivery. 199
Rosenthal begins its preemption analysis with a notation that "the
weight of the authority [in the Eleventh Circuit] supports the com-
plete preemptive force of the Carmack Amendment as it relates to
claims for damages or loss of property involved in interstate transpor-
191. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(19) (2002).
192. Lamm, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 n. 7.
193. 49 U.S.C. §15103 (2002); Lamm, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1311, 1312 & n.6.
194. Lamm, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1311, 1312 & n.6.
195. Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 890 F.2d 1112, 1116 (10th
Cir. 1989).
196. 174 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
197. Id. at 1332.
198. Id. at 1332-33.
199. Id. at 1332.
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tation. ' '200 The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' emotional dis-
tress claims were based on "the Defendant's alleged actions in
delivery of their belongings. '20 1 In other words, the plaintiff's mental
distress claims were based on the carrier's conduct in connection with
its regulated delivery "services. '202
Relying on Rini, Gordon, Hubbard and Lamm, however, the Rosen-
thal court held that the plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress and
loss of consortium were non-preempted because "these claims do not
directly seek relief for the loss of or damage to the household goods
.. "203 The Court concludes in an ambiguous passage that the plain-
tiffs' tort claims, "although arguably related to the household ship-
ment and delivery, assert emotional distress for more than that related
to the damage to their goods. ''2 04 In attempting to define Carmack's
scope by relying on flawed precedents, Rosenthal becomes lost in se-
mantics. The Rosenthal court, like Lamm, also cites the savings clause
in Section 13103 as authority for holding that the plaintiffs' tort claims
against the carrier were consonant with Carmack.20 5 The Rosenthal
court later vacated its opinion in accordance with the parties'
settlement.206
Rini, Gordon, Hubbard, Lamm and Rosenthal perpetuate the fal-
lacy that Carmack does not bar tort claims alleging personal injuries
"separate" from "direct" property loss or damage, even if the pur-
ported injuries result from the carrier's regulated contractual "ser-
vices" that the bill of lading covers. 207 These cases disregard the
Supreme Court's ruling in Adams Express that Carmack limits a car-
rier's liability for any default in its common law duty to the shipper
under the bill of lading. They are out of step with the great majority
of recent federal court decisions holding that Carmack completely
preempts all state law claims based on a carrier's alleged breach of its
contractual duties under the interstate bill of lading agreement. 20 8
200. Rosenthal, 174 F. Supp. 2d. at 1335.
201. Id. at 1336.
202. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(19) (2002).
203. Rosenthal, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1336 (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Rosenthal v. United Van Lines, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
207. See Rini, 104 F.3d 502; Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282; Hubbard, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 1374; Lamm, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1300; Rosenthal, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1331.
208. Cf. Bear MGC Cutlery Co. v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 937, 937-38 (N.D.
Ala. 2001) (state claims including "outrage" held preempted by Carmack and remand motion
denied).
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VI. THE MOVING INDUSTRY'S CLAIM ARBITRATION PROGRAM
Most of the cases that have generated litigation against interstate
motor carriers alleging consumer fraud and emotional distress claims
involve household goods disputes. Thus, a brief review of the moving
industry's national claim statistics and ICCTA's arbitration program is
in order.
A. An Overview of Moving Claims
The American Moving and Storage Association (AMSA), an asso-
ciation of 3,500 international, interstate and local moving and storage
companies, estimates that approximately 1.3 million household goods
shipments are transported annually in interstate commerce. 20 9 In
1996, the AMSA's predecessor organization, the American Movers
Conference (AMC), conducted a study of claims that interstate mov-
ers received and paid.210 The AMC found that 121,909 claims were
filed with eight major interstate movers on a total of 557,543 national
account, collect-on-delivery (COD) and government shipments.211
The AMC further determined that carriers paid about 96% of all
claims that were filed.2 12 The average claim was filed for $972.00 and
the average settlement payment was $610.00.213
The author's survey of moving industry sources, shipper associa-
tions and private and public consumer groups has not disclosed any
statistical data on the frequency of shipper complaints against inter-
state movers for unfair claims handling. In 2000, the United States
Department of Transportation (DOT) logged some 4,000 consumer
complaints of all types against movers for which the FMCSA has in-
vestigative responsibility.214
B. ICCTA's Alternative Dispute Resolution Provision
ICCTA2 15 provides for arbitration of household goods claims as the
preferred alternative to lawsuits.21 6 Section 14708(a) requires, as a
condition of registration, that household goods carriers offer shippers
a dispute settlement program that impartial persons administer.2 17
209. John D. Schulz, Longing for the ICC, TRAFFIC WORLD, July 23, 2001, at 11, 13, 14.





214. Schultz, supra note 208, at 13.
215. 49 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
216. 49 U.S.C. §14708 (2002).
217. 49 U.S.C. § 14708(a) (2002).
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Section 14708(b)(8) requires the arbitrator to render a decision within
60 days of receiving written notification of the dispute. 218 Section
14708(d) provides for an award of attorneys fees to a shipper in a
court action after an arbitration if: (a) the shipper has filed a claim
with the carrier within 120 days of delivery; (b) the shipper prevails on
its suit and either (c) an arbitration decision was not rendered within
the mandatory 60-day period; or (d) the shipper must file suit to en-
force the arbitration award.219 The clear intent of Section 14708 is to
foster arbitration in lieu of litigation. Voluntary settlement of shipper
claims has always been one of the objectives of the ICA and the ICC's
and FMCSA's claim-filing regulations. 220
According to the AMSA, of the 3,159 shipper requests for arbitra-
tion during 1996 through 2001, arbitration through the AMSA's Dis-
pute Settlement (Arbitration) Program resolved 1,330 cases. 221
Arbitration did not actually resolve most of the cases because they
were settled, shippers withdrew them, carriers declined them as previ-
ously settled, or they were non-eligible for arbitration for various rea-
sons. The AMSA further reported that during the 1996-2001 period,
the average amounts claimed in its arbitration program ranged from
$4,785 to $6,264 while the average award ranged from $1,220 to
$2,104.222 Section 14708 arbitration requests have steadily increased
from 96 requests in 1996 to 721 requests in 2001.223 As a percentage
of approximately 900,000 national account and COD interstate ship-
ments in 2001, the 721 arbitration requests filed that year with the
AMSA averaged less than one per 1,000 shipments.224 These statistics
indicate that ICCTA's goal of affording shippers an economic and ex-
peditious alternative to court litigation is being fulfilled.
218. 49 U.S.C. § 14708(b) (2002).
219. 49 U.S.C. § 14708(d) (2002).
220. See also Pathway Bellows, Inc. v. Blanchette, 630 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 915 (1981) ("[Tjhe ICC's principal aim in promulgating these regulations was to
encourage parties to settle claims instead of resorting to costly time-consuming litigation .... ");
Wis. Packing Co. v. Ind. Refrigerator Lines, Inc., 618 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980) ("[Ilt is apparent that the purpose of the regulation was to
make claim settlement more expeditious by providing procedures for the voluntary disposition
of claims by carriers.") (emphasis added).




224. D. Hauenstein, Don't Get Caught: Movers Likely to be Targets of Increased Enforcement
Activity by FMCSA, DIRECTION, Jan. 2002, 24, at 29.
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VII. THE KERRY BILL: A PROCRUSTEAN BED?
In Greek mythology Poseidon's evil son Procrustes is said to have
forced travelers to stretch or lop off their limbs in order to fit into his
iron bed. Thus, Procrustes' bed has become a metaphor for any
scheme into which something is arbitrarily forced regardless of indi-
vidual circumstances or differences. The proposed MCRA presently
pending before Congress would, in Procrustean fashion, effectively
sever the "actual loss" liability standard in Section 14706(a) and refit
ICCTA with a new Section 14706(h) authorizing punitive damages to
shippers for alleged unfair carrier claim handling - just as state law
defines! The Kerry Bill is not only reflexive and ahistorical in its con-
ception, it is fundamentally incompatible with ICCTA's general
scheme.
A. The MCRA's Provisions
When the MCRA was first introduced in the Senate in 2000, its
sponsor acknowledged that it was the result of lobbying efforts by the
plaintiff involved in the Rini case. 225 The proposed bill would amend
Title 49 U.S.C. Section 14706 to include the following new subsection
(h):
Nothing in this section limits the liability of a carrier for punitive
damages authorized under applicable State law for any act or omis-
sion of the carrier in connection with the investigation, settlement,
adjudication, or other aspect of the processing of a claim under this
section that constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice under
such State law.226
The proposed amendment to Section 14706 would be retroactive to
January 1, 1990, coincidentally the same year the plaintiff in Rini
shipped her goods and well before timely claims could still arise under
standard bill of lading terms or even most state laws. 227
B. The Irrelevance of State D TPAs to Interstate Transit Claims
In weighing the wisdom of incorporating state Deceptive Trade
Practices Acts (DTPAs) en masse into Carmack, as the MCRA aspires
to do, it is worth recalling the origins and intent of the DTPAs. In
1964 and 1966, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Bar Association approved the
original and Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.228 Al-
225. 146 CONG. REc. S2347-02 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 1 (1966) (repealed 2000).
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though one authority describes the kinds of acts constituting "decep-
tive" or "unfair" business conduct as "notoriously undefined," the
purpose of the Uniform DTPA was to deter trademark infringement,
passing off goods and services as those of competitors and false adver-
tising.229 There is no suggestion in the text of the Uniform DTPA, or
its history, that it was designed or intended to regulate the processing
of property claims of any kind, let alone interstate transit claims.
In general, the states' DTPAs are unsuitably vague legal standards
for adjudicating suits alleging improper claim handling. These laws
are especially inappropriate guides for resolving disputes arising out
of interstate transportation and related carrier services. In a federal
case involving unfair competition claims, the Second Circuit long ago
recognized the difficulty of applying state law to interstate transac-
tions. The Court of Appeals commented, "[s]ince most cases involve
interstate transactions, perhaps some day the much needed federal
statute or uniform laws on unfair competition will be passed. 2 30
Where federal uniformity is already well developed under Carmack
and ICCTA's regulations governing loss and damage claims against
interstate motor carriers, the wholesale transplanting of state DTPAs
into federal law would be illogical and highly destabilizing to the fed-
eral scheme.
C. The MCRA's Conflict with ICCTA and Other Federal Laws
Application of state consumer laws to interstate carrier liability
under bills of lading would completely undo Carmack's 'actual loss'
standard. Under Carmack's uniform standard, the carrier is liable for
an amount up to the shipper's actual loss regardless of the carrier's
subjective intent or state of mind while processing the shipper's claim
for the loss. Under the terms of the MCRA's proposed subsection
(h), however, the courts would be required to divine whether the car-
rier's hard bargaining or refusal to pay the shipper's claim as de-
manded is "unfair" or a "deceptive" act under state law.2 31
Many states do not recognize a right to recover punitive damages
for mere contractual breaches, regardless of the breacher's motive,
unless the offending conduct entails some additional intentional mis-
conduct amounting to an independent tort. In other words, the same
conduct constituting a contractual breach cannot also give rise to a
229. Id.
230. Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271 (2d Cir. 1959).
231. 146 CONG. REC. S2347-02 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
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tort claim without jeopardizing the integrity of contracts. 232 Simply
put, punitive damages are not ordinarily recoverable for a breach of
contract.233 Therefore, even under most state laws, the mere failure of
a motor carrier to pay a claim would not support a cause of action in
tort, let alone the imposition of punitive damages.
Aside from the obvious conflict between state punitive damages
laws and Carmack's 'actual loss' liability standard, the proposed
MCRA's incompatibility with other ICCTA provisions234 also merits
attention. The enactment of subsection (h) would inevitably lead to
conflicts between the multitude of state consumer codes and the
FMCSA's federal claim-processing regulations. For instance, what
would happen under the MCRA if, as in Varnville, some ninety years
ago, a state consumer law imposes a penalty on a carrier for failing to
investigate and pay a shipper's claim within 40 days while the existing
federal regulations give a carrier 120 days235 to investigate and pay or
decline a claim? More to the point, why would anyone want to im-
plant Carmack with a 'catch-all' provision that would generate endless
conflicts between federal laws and state DTPAs?
Under the MCRA, damages awards against carriers, in cases where
Carmack's uniform liability standard supposedly governs, would turn
unpredictably on which of the 50 states happens to be the origin or
destination of an interstate shipment, where the shipper's suit is filed
and which state's law the court applies. Would the applicable law be
that of the state where the shipment is booked, the state where the
goods are picked up or delivered, the state where the claimant hap-
pens to reside or the state where the carrier's allegedly unfair claim
adjuster is employed? If the MCRA became law, the shipper would
naturally seek to file suit against the carrier in the state with the most
punitive consumer laws to maximize his damages for the carrier's al-
leged breach of the bill of lading contract.
Replacing Carmack's uniform claim and suit filing periods 236 with
an assortment of state DTPA statutory periods would frustrate
ICCTA's objective of bringing predictability and certainty to the dis-
position of loss and damage claims. Under the MCRA, Carmack-au-
232. First Trust Nat'l Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 220 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 2000);
Future Tech Int'l., Inc. v. Tae I1 Media, Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 1538,1566 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("[T]ort law
and contract law must be held apart in order to foster the reliability of commercial
transactions.").
233. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACrs § 1077 (1964).
234. See §§ 49 U.S.C. 14501(c), 14708 (2002).
235. 49 C.F.R. § 370.9(a) (2002).
236. The carrier may require the shipper to file a pre-suit claim within nine months of delivery
and file suit within two years after declination of the claim. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(e) (2002).
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thorized tariff and bill of lading limitation periods would be
meaningless if state consumer laws take precedence. Eventually, the
MCRA would revive the very kinds of shipper preferences that the
ICA was meant to abolish. Indeed, the ICA's original anti-preference
policy remains particularly vital in the interstate transportation of
household goods for which the ICCTA requires carriers to set out
their rules and rates in published tariffs.237
Some proponents of more stringent regulation of the moving indus-
try call for Congress to install an expeditious system for resolving con-
sumer claims.2 38 As discussed above,239 Section 14708 already
provides one. The proposed Section 14706(h), however, would under-
mine Section 14708 by encouraging shippers to forego arbitration with
movers in favor of potentially more lucrative punitive damages litiga-
tion. Considering ICCTA's national policy of providing uniform com-
pensation to shippers rather than punishment of carriers, the omission
of private punitive remedies from the ICCTA and the FMCSA regula-
tions was not an oversight. By offering shippers a financial incentive
to pursue court litigation, the MCRA's authorizing of punitive awards
against carriers would frustrate ICCTA's policy of encouraging settle-
ments through informal dispute resolution.
The proposed MCRA's multiplier effect on the carrier's bill of lad-
ing liability could also result in a dramatic increase in the volume of
Carmack cases in the federal courts. Presently, the federal courts
have original jurisdiction over Carmack suits in which the amount in
dispute exceeds $10,000 per bill of lading, excluding costs and inter-
est. 240 The reason Congress established the $10,000 per bill of lading
jurisdictional amount was to limit the number of small cases filed in or
removed to the federal courts.241 If a carrier's potential liability under
its bill of lading could be trebled or more under state law, the $10,000
per bill of lading limitation would become a meaningless threshold.
In sum, allowing recovery of exemplary damages against interstate
carriers for alleged unfair claim handling, deceptive trade practices,
emotional distress and other such state law causes of action would
nullify the uniform federal scheme governing carrier liability. Any
carrier's claim declination or tough negotiating stance would invite a
suit for consumer fraud. In its net effect, the Kerry Bill's impact on
237. 49 U.S.C. § 13702(c) (2002).
238. Kaiser, supra note 50, at 309.
239. See supra Part VI.B.
240. 28 U.S.C. § § 1337(a), 1445(b) (2002).
241. 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3729 (3d ed. 1998).
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interstate carriers' rate structures would result in shippers, whose
states have more draconian consumer laws, being subsidized by ship-
pers in states with less punitive or no such laws at all.
In view of the arbitration remedy afforded shippers under Section
14708 and the lack of empirical data on alleged carrier bad-faith claim
handling, the MCRA seems to be a solution in search of a problem.
To paraphrase Moffit, the MCRA would, under the guise of consumer
protection, return the shipper-carrier relationship to the pre-Carmack
'morass' that existed before 1906. The proposed amendment to
ICCTA could also lead to the erosion of uniform liability standards in
the federal laws governing other modes of interstate and international
transportation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of complete federal preemption of state law claims
with respect to interstate carriers' transportation and related services
is embodied in ICCTA and its supplemental federal regulations.
ICCTA and Carmack have met the need for stable interstate carrier
rates and a national uniform standard of carrier liability that covers
the entire contractual relationship between the shipper and carrier of
which claim handling is an integral part. Carmack's reach extends to
the point at which the carrier steps beyond its contractual obligations
to the shipper through a breach of its general duty of care that is owed
to the public at large.
Rini retired the dubious notion that interstate shipments can be tri-
furcated so as to limit Carmack only to the intermediate phase, that is,
the actual movement of the goods. Rini's vague dicta, however, seeks
to define a class of non-preempted claims that could arise where in-
tentional carrier misconduct might cause physical or mental harm be-
yond what the interstate bill of lading contract could reasonably
contemplate. The problem is that Rini's dicta provides no real gui-
dance in the vast majority of cases where all provable shipper dam-
ages stem directly from the carrier's handling of the goods. Gordon
and other courts have compounded Rini's confusion through their im-
plication that the carrier's regulated services and contractual conduct
can somehow give rise to intentional tort liability.
The proposed MCRA raises the question whether Congress should
amend Carmack to permit the 50 states to impose their diverse stan-
dards of consumer law liability on interstate carriers for claim han-
dling conduct that is already federally regulated and an integral part
of the carrier's statutory and contractual duties under its bill of lading.
The proposed Section 14706(h) does not mesh with ICCTA's preemp-
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tion provision in Section 14501(c) that applies to all carrier 'services'.
With its punitive damages incentive, the MCRA also thwarts Con-
gress's effort to promote shipper-carrier arbitration under Section
14708.
The advocates for expanding state law into the interstate shipper-
carrier relationship have not made a persuasive case for abolishing
Carmack's uniform liability standard and overriding the federal claim-
processing regulations with state DTPAs and consumer statutes. Con-
sidering the nominal amounts typically involved in loss and damage
claims and the infrequency of allegations against interstate movers for
bad faith claim adjusting, the existing statutory and regulatory reme-
dies provide sufficient deterrents to unreasonable carrier conduct and
an expeditious arbitration procedure for resolving disputes in lieu of
protracted, expensive lawsuits.
Even if available, shipper remedies were shown to be inadequate,
replacing existing federal standards with the chequered laws of the 50
states would not serve the public interest in maintaining stable uni-
form freight rates, standard carrier liability rules, carrier financial sta-
bility and judicial economy. Rather, the appropriate response would
be to amend the federal law applied evenly to shippers and carriers
throughout the nation. Any federal law provision for punitive dam-
ages against carriers would clash with Carmack's 'actual loss' liability
standard.
In the final analysis, Congress must decide whether to maintain a
uniform system of carrier liability and promote informal resolution of
shipper claims under Section 14708, or instead, encourage claimants to
pursue rancorous litigation that is driven solely on the prospect of pu-
nitive windfalls. ICCTA cannot fulfill its intended goals of establish-
ing uniform rates and carrier liability and promoting arbitration of
household goods disputes while, at the same time, offering shippers an
array of state law remedies for maximizing carrier liability with puni-
tive awards. In the interest of preserving a coherent national trans-
portation policy, Congress should not abdicate to the states its
Constitutionally-mandated duty to regulate interstate commerce and
its power to 'make all Laws' necessary to carry out that duty.
2003]

